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Introduction
Technology has always been a vital component of human development, most often
aimed at the advancement of human well-being. However, the introduction of new
technologies may also introduce harmful consequences. Indeed, we often do not
know beforehand the full spectrum of potential impacts and hazards that these new
technologies may bring about. Conventional approaches to risk governance are not
directly applicable to these fields due to high levels of uncertainty and ignorance.
The inadequacies of these conventional approaches do not, however, warrant
categorically rejecting the introduction of new technologies. At the same time, since
those uncertain or unknown technological risks and dangers often only materialize
after a long time (e.g., asbestos, DDT), there seems to be a need for flexible
approaches that are adaptive to new information about the impact of technologies. A
broad scholarship has been reflecting on how to deal with new and potentially risky
technologies. Within that scholarship, some authors have argued to conceive of new
technologies as social experiments and to look for the conditions under which such
experiments are morally justified. In this special issue we look at the implications of
using this social experiment lens under four overarching themes: philosophical
underpinnings of the notion of experiments, the conditions that justify experimen-
tation, the opportunities of experimentation, and how to define agents’ moral
responsibility in the social experiment.
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Conceptual Overview
The first theme is about the philosophical underpinnings and conceptualization of
the notion of experiment. The first contribution is by Hansson (2015), who
emphasizes the need to distinguish between experiments, in the standard scientific
sense of the term, and non-experimental observations. These are tailored to different
epistemic needs. Hansson makes the distinction between action-guiding and
epistemic experiments and reflects on the justification of these different types of
experiments. Similarly, Kroes (2015) discusses the differences between experiments
as used in the natural and social sciences and the notion of socio-technical
experiments in the light of control and the possibility of intervention. Especially the
notion of control, as commonly used in scientific experiments, will lose its standard
meaning if applied to socio-technical systems, Kroes argues. Schiaffonati (2015)
elaborates the notion of control in computer experiments. She introduces a
distinction between a priori and a posteriori control. Whereas a priori control relies
on anticipation, in a posteriori control the idea of full anticipation has been
abandoned and control will be carried out after the artefact has been inserted into
society.
This immediately relates to the second theme: under what conditions is social
experimentation justified from an ethical point of view? Experimentation is often
used in a pejorative sense (e.g. when the experimental subject is considered a
‘‘guinea pig’’), which prompts the question how we can distinguish responsible
from irresponsible experimentation. Van de Poel (2015) develops a framework for
assessing the acceptability of such experiments based on the bioethical principles
for experiments with human subjects: non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for
autonomy, and justice. These four broad criteria can be further specified into a set of
fifteen conditions, which are to be seen as prima facie moral obligations that are
open to further specification for specific technologies and to revision in the light of
new experiences. Acknowledging the experimental character of technological
innovation, Schro¨der (2015) develops an account of socio-technical experiments
that combines the experimental lens with insights from Actor-Network-Theory.
Schro¨der’s framework includes both the epistemological realm of experiments (the
‘‘method’’) but also the natural and material realm (the ‘‘things’’) and the social
realm (the delegation of ‘‘action’’ to technology). It could be used as a ‘‘sensitizing
concept’’ to explore under what conditions experimentation is indeed responsible.
She elaborates this framework on the basis of the geological disposal of nuclear
waste, which is also the focal technology of Jan Bergen’s contribution (Bergen
2015). Bergen emphasizes the reversibility of consequences as a condition sine qua
non for responsible experimentation. Responsible experimentation requires that we
should be able to stop the experiment and undo its consequences when we think it is
no longer desirable to proceed. He illustrates his argument on the basis of the
geological disposal of nuclear waste. Kendig (2015) focuses on the early research
phase of technology development and she shows how epistemic categories of
cutting edge research into technologies prompt new ethical categories. Using the
notion of proof of concept research she explains how the epistemic lens, through
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which we look at new technologies, influences how we interact with these
technologies in a moral sense and which moral questions we should ask about these
technologies. She develops the idea of extended agency ethics as an agent-based
framework for addressing ethical challenges in proof of concept research.
Recognizing that the locus of normative agency and intentionality in proof of
concept research is distributed across the activities of different research groups and
actors, this approach provides a naturalistic alternative for traditional individualistic
approaches like consequentialism and deontology that are less suitable for dealing
with technologies that are still in an experimental stage. The notion of responsible
experimentation is also discussed in the contribution by Doorn (2015). Doorn
discusses a case study in the water domain to explore the questions of when and
under what conditions governance experiments are likely to be responsible
experiments. She shows that governance experiments can be responsible experi-
ments, but that effort should be put in how to organize these experiments and how to
involve the stakeholders to ensure that these experiments do not come at the
expense of legitimacy.
The third theme is about the opportunities of conceiving of technologies as social
experiments. Is it applicable to all technologies or maybe only to some
technologies? Or has it maybe even wider applicability? Hawkins (2015) applies
the experimental lens to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). For Ronnie
Hawkins, the experimental lens provides an alternative to the precautionary
principle, which she deems unsuitable for evaluating complex technologies like
GMOs. Hawkins’ main criticism to the precautionary approach is that it does not
challenge the underlying economic assumptions, like discounting the future and
trade-offs between environmental regulation and risks that come with regulation.
Instead, Hawkins defends an experimental approach, which she links to the
ecological notion of resilience. Asveld (2016) discusses the lock-in that has
occurred in the policies of the European Union concerning the development of first
generation biofuels. Initially hailed as a green sustainable technology, these first
generation biofuels have become controversial due to uncertainties about their
physical impact, their moral evaluation, and their institutional embedding. Since a
considerable number of member states developed an economic interest in these first
generation biofuels, alteration of the EU policies to accommodate for these effects
met with fierce resistance. Asveld shows how an experimental approach to the
development of sustainable bio-based technologies may have prevented such a lock-
in. Pieters et al. (2015) apply the experimentation paradigm to the context of cyber-
security. Whereas the new technologies as social experiments paradigm is primarily
discussed in the context of safety, Pieters and colleagues show how insights from
the security domain may provide additional conditions for responsible experimen-
tation to make it applicable for situations in which the primary threats come from
adversarial use of the technology and deliberate attacks rather than a lack of safety
of the technology itself. Like Pieters and colleagues, Stilgoe (2015) also tries to
move beyond mere direct safety risks. Stilgoe applies the experimental lens to
geoengineering. Since the outcomes of geoengineering are highly speculative,
geoengineering seems to be the paradigmatic case of a social experiment. On the
basis of the first UK field geoengineering test site, Stilgoe shows how the
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involvement of social scientists in this project lead to a renegotiation of what is
known and what is unknown and also to the inclusion of more than just the direct
risks. This new mode of governance, which he refers to as collective experimen-
tation, allows us to ‘‘experiment with experimentation,’’ therewith extending the
scope of experimentation beyond technology itself. According to Stilgoe, exper-
iment should be seen as a verb rather than a noun.
This brings us to the last theme in this special issue, which relates to the notion of
responsibility in a social experiment. During the development of a technology and
after it has been introduced in society several actors become involved in the
experiment. Thismay blur the distribution of responsibilities between different parties
involved and prompt questions as to what these responsibilities entail. It thereby also
links to issues of democratization of science. Spruit et al. (2015) discuss the topic of
responsibility in relation to nanoscale science and engineering. Since a well-defined
nano-community is lacking, the attribution of responsibility in the development of
nanotechnologies is problematic. Spruit and colleagues argue that if we want
responsible development in dispersed scientific and engineering fields, like nan-
otechnology, individual researchers have the duty to organize themselves to create
collective agents that have the capacity to steer technological development. The same
issue of ascribing responsibility is in the context contamination of GMOs. Robaey
(2016) argues that since owners reap benefits off of new technologies, they should
have forward looking responsibilities. Also, the lack of knowledge about those
technologies does not remove moral responsibility on the effects of the GMOs they
own. Using the lens of social experimentation allows defining the forward-looking
moral responsibility of owners as a set of epistemic virtues they should strive to
develop in order to learn and react to the technologies they are using and spreading.
Krabbenborg (2015) focuses on the involvement of civil society actors as
knowledgeable dialogue partner in the development and governance of emerging
technologies. Based onDewey’s notion of reflective inquiry, Krabbenborg argues that
scientists and engineers working on new and emerging technologies have a
responsibility to participate in such reflective inquiries with the publics. In order to
facilitate this, existing institutions have to evolve as well to allow inquiry and
deliberation among different relevant actors. Like Stilgoe, Krabbenborg argues for
flexibility to allow for tentative approaches rather than strict arrangements. With this
special issue, we hope to have provided insights on how an experimental lens may
provide newways to reflect on themoral evaluation of new technologies.We thank all
the authors for their valuable contribution.
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